You built an app in Bolt.new, it runs, and now you want to know what a security scan would say before you put it in front of App Review or real users. For a solo founder shipping AI-generated code, that instinct is the right one, because the issues that matter most here stay invisible while the app works perfectly.
Short answer
A Bolt.new security scan report tells you which secrets, backend rules, and data paths in your generated app are exposed, mapped to a standard such as OWASP MASVS. The findings that dominate are hardcoded API keys in the client bundle, missing Supabase Row Level Security, and auth checks that exist in a comment but not in the code. The risk is real at scale: NowSecure reports that roughly one in four code samples from leading AI assistants contained at least one confirmed OWASP vulnerability. A scan turns those into a list you can fix before submitting.
What you should know
- The dangerous issues are silent: an exposed key or an open database does not break the app, so it survives normal testing.
- Client code is public: anything in a web or React Native bundle, including an API key, can be read by anyone who downloads the app.
- Supabase RLS is off by default: until you enable it per table, the public anon key can expose your data.
- Auth in a comment is common: AI-generated route files sometimes describe an auth check in a comment without implementing it.
- A scan reads the build, not your prompts: it inspects the compiled bundle or the deployed code, which is what an attacker sees.
What does a Bolt.new security scan actually check?
A scan groups findings into the same categories whether the build is web or mobile. It looks for secrets exposed in the client bundle, backend access rules that are missing or permissive, network calls that bypass a server, insecure storage of tokens, and permissions the build requests. Each maps to an OWASP MASVS control for mobile or the OWASP Top 10 for the web and API layer. For a Bolt.new app heading to the App Store, the relevant artifact is the compiled bundle that Bolt produces through Expo, and the scan reads that the way a reviewer or an attacker would.
Why do AI-built apps like Bolt.new ship these issues?
Because the generator optimizes for a working feature, not a defended one. When you ask Bolt.new to add OpenAI, Stripe, or Supabase, the fastest code that works often puts the key directly in the frontend and calls the provider from the browser. NowSecure, citing AppSec Santa research measured against the OWASP Top 10, found that approximately one in four AI-generated code samples carried at least one confirmed vulnerability, with server-side request forgery, injection, and security misconfiguration among the most common. The pattern is consistent: the code runs on the first try and leaves the security configuration as a step the model does not take.
A typical exposed-key pattern looks like this:
// Anti-pattern: the secret ships in the client bundle
const openai = new OpenAI({ apiKey: "sk-proj-REDACTED" });
// Safer: call your own backend route, keep the key server-side
const res = await fetch("/api/generate", { method: "POST", body: input });
What shows up most often in a Bolt.new scan report?
The same handful of findings recur across generated apps. The table lists the common ones, where they live, and the direction of the fix.
| Finding | Where it lives | Fix direction |
|---|---|---|
| Hardcoded API key | Client bundle or a .env shipped to production | Move the call server-side, then rotate the key |
| Supabase RLS disabled | Database tables reachable by the public anon key | Enable RLS and write per-table policies |
| Auth check missing | A route handler where the check is commented out | Implement the check server-side |
| Direct browser-to-provider call | Frontend calling Stripe or OpenAI directly | Proxy the call through your own backend |
| No rate limiting | Public endpoints and serverless functions | Add rate limits and input validation |
How do you read and act on the report before submitting?
Triage by severity, then fix in order. The order that works:
- Rotate and remove exposed secrets first, since a leaked key is the fastest path to a real bill or a breach.
- Turn on Supabase Row Level Security and write a policy for every table the anon key can reach, then test that an unauthenticated request is refused.
- Move provider calls behind your own backend so keys never reach the client.
- Add the missing auth checks in code, not in comments, and add basic rate limiting.
- Rebuild and rescan, because a fix that is not in the shipped bundle is not a fix.
For the mobile submission specifically, a pre-submission scan such as PTKD.com (https://ptkd.com) reads the compiled APK, AAB, or IPA and reports findings against OWASP MASVS, which is the same artifact App Review and an attacker work from. Running it after your fixes confirms the changes actually made it into the build.
What to watch out for
A scan has real limits. Static analysis reads what is in the bundle, so it flags an exposed key or a missing manifest entry well, but it cannot confirm that your Supabase policies actually deny an unauthorized read; that needs a live test against the database. No scanner detects every issue, and a clean report is not a promise that the app is secure, only that the checked patterns passed. Treat the report as the floor and not the ceiling: fix what it finds, test the backend rules by hand, and keep secrets out of the client in the first place rather than scrubbing them after the fact.
What to take away
- A Bolt.new security scan report surfaces the silent issues, exposed keys, open databases, and missing auth, that a working app hides.
- The root cause is functionality-first generation; NowSecure found roughly one in four AI-generated code samples carried a confirmed OWASP vulnerability.
- Fix in order: rotate exposed secrets, enable Supabase RLS, move provider calls server-side, then rebuild and rescan.
- For a mobile release, a pre-submission scan such as PTKD.com reads the compiled APK, AAB, or IPA against OWASP MASVS, so you find these issues before App Review or an attacker does.
